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CHRISTOPHER S. ELMENDORF

Securing Ecological Investments on
Other People's Land: A TransactionCosts Perspective
ABSTRACT
This exploratory article on contracting for habitat restoration
considers landowner and land-trust strategies under the
following conditions: (1) restoration entails initial specific
investments by the land trust and adaptation over time, (2)
landowners are uncertain about land-trust "type" (specifically,
whether the land trust's hidden agenda is to oust the landowner),
(3) land trusts are uncertain about landowner type (specifically,
the landowner'sprivate cost of complying with the contract), and
(4) habitat restoration is characterized by increasing returns to
scale (contiguous acreage). Several contracting strategies are
compared. Two appear promising: "liability-rule conservation
easements," which would establish contractingframeworks with
third-party determination of price; and "collective contracting"
via supermajoritarianspecial districts authorized by law to bind
the member landowners. It is suggested that contracts with
special districts may prove valuable not only for overcoming
holdouts, but also as a way of reducing the land trust's
vulnerability to opportunism that is premised on asymmetric
information about landowner type.
I. INTRODUCTION
You own worked-over but ecologically valuable land. I want to
protect what ecological function it still has, and more: I want to restore it
to ecological glory. I might do this by making your land my land-by
*
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buying it-and then by giving it over to the ministrations of
conservation biologists and restoration ecologists. But you may have
powerful attachments to your land and be unwilling to part with it for
anything like the prevailing market price. Or, if I am the government or a
conservation organization, there may be de facto political constraints on
my owning "too much" land in your community.1 Or if you have a
special talent that I lack for, say, cultivating food or timber, it may be
economically efficient for you to maintain a correlative ownership
interest.2 The question then becomes whether we can forge a mutually
beneficial contractual arrangement whereby you continue to own the
land, or some interest in it, while I invest in its ecological rehabilitation.
That question is the subject of this article.
The style of this article is exploratory. It situates "conservation
contracting" within the literature on opportunism in contractual
relationships and identifies various techniques and institutions, some
familiar and some more fanciful, that might be used to manage the forms
of opportunism to which conservation contracting appears vulnerable.
The ambition of the article is not to establish formally the superiority of
one or another contracting tool, in the context of a neat and simple model
of transactional opportunism, but rather to provoke thought about a
range of concerns and possible solutions. The article anticipates a followup empirical project on the conservation contracting techniques actually
in use, and also an ongoing conversation with conservation practitioners,
through which academics may come to better understand the
weaknesses of their suppositions, and practitioners in the infant industry
of private lands conservation may be encouraged to think more
expansively about their enterprise. It is also my hope that further studies
in a formal vein will refine and challenge the economic conjectures and
intuitions presented here.
I analyze conservation contracting in terms of a set of strategic
interactions between two types of land trusts, 3 the "greens" and the
"dark greens," and two types of landowners, the "olives" and the
"browns." In this schema, greens aspire to protect working landscapes in
which dispersed rural land ownership and economic activity persist

1. See generally Christopher S. Elmendorf, Ideas, Incentives, Gifts, and Governance:
Toward Conservation Stewardship of PrivateLand, in Culturaland PsychologicalPerspective, 2003
U. ILL. L. REv. 423.

2. See Dominic P. Parker, Land Trusts and the Choice to Conserve Land with Full
Ownership or Conservation Easements, 44 NAT. RESOuRcES J. 483 (2004).
3. "Land trust" is the emergent term for a nonprofit organization that secures, by
contract, protections for the environmental amenity values of privately owned land. See
generally LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, at www.lta.org (last visited Apr. 8, 2004).
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even as the greens invest in the restoration of degraded habitats. 4 Dark
greens may mouth the green line, but their true ambition is to
consolidate land ownership, displace rural inhabitants, and let
"wilderness" reclaim the land.
On the landowner side, olives share many of the ideals of the
green land trusts. For olives, cooperating with the greens to restore
degraded habitats has a positive subjective value-though this may be
outweighed by objective costs like foregone agricultural output or
development opportunities. 5 Browns represent the mirror image of the
olives. Subjectively, they tend to disvalue cooperative/restorative
ventures with environmental groups. Landowners and land trusts
negotiate under conditions of asymmetric information about one
another's true type.
The greens' conservation investments are characterized by the
following features: (1) a high degree of asset specificity, vis-a-vis the
target landscape (investments, once made, have little salvage value
should the project be abandoned); (2) potentially long lives (an initial
investment may create ecological benefits for many years, with relatively
modest upkeep costs); (3) ex-ante uncertainty regarding ecological
benefits; and (4) increasing returns to scale (contiguous acreage subject to
conservationist management).
Under these conditions, the green land trust that undertakes to
contract for ecological restoration may find itself hobbled by two forms
of landowner opportunism: temporal opportunism (hold-up problems),
whereby the landowner tries to appropriate the land trust's initial
specific investment on her parcel by demanding an excessive price in
subsequent contracting periods; and spatial opportunism (hold-out
problems), whereby landowners try to exploit the fact of increasing
returns to scale by threatening not to participate in the conservation
organization's landscape-level 6 restoration plan.
Temporal opportunism arises in many commercial relationships.
The standard solution is either long-term contracts or vertical integration. Analogously, the land trust and landowner might economize on
temporal opportunism costs by agreeing to a long-term or perpetual
4. For more on the "working landscapes" perspective on environmental restoration,
see the web site and publications of the Sonoran Institute, available at www.sonoran.org
(last visited Apr. 8, 2004).
5. By subjective value, I mean the intrinsic or consumption value (positive or
negative) that the landowner attaches to the restoration endeavor, apart from whatever
financial costs or benefits ("objective value") are incurred.
6. By "landscape level," I mean a plan targeted at an ecological landscape in which
property is held by numerous individuals, rather than a plan targeted at a particular landowner.
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conservation easement that establishes ecological performance objectives
and partitions land management rights between the landowner and the
land trust. Yet, under the conditions posited by this article - specifically,
landowner uncertainty about land trust type and landowner fear of a
dark-green land grab -landowners would much prefer to deal with land
trusts through a sequence of short-term contracts that spell out the
landowner's rights with specificity. And, I will suggest, the green land
trusts themselves have reputational reasons to favor short-term contracts
for ecological management, provided that temporal opportunism by
landowners can somehow be moderated.
This article identifies five means by which landowner
opportunism over a series of short-term conservation contracts might be
controlled: land trust reputation (for never conceding to hold-up
demands during contract renewal negotiations), open space easements,
landowner signaling of idiosyncratic preferences, liability-rule conservation easements (through which the land trust and landowner would
contract into liability rules to govern subsequent short-term contracts),
and mortgages. The efficacy of most of these strategies is limited, at
bottom, by the landowner's private information about the costs to her
(subjective as well as financial) of complying with the land trust's
proposed conservation plan. The liability-rule easement seems the most
promising strategy, both as a way of inducing landowners truthfully to
reveal their preferences and known compliance costs ex ante and as a
way of sustaining a long-term, economically efficient program of
ecological investment even in the event that the landowner's preferences
turn out to be "browner" than initially anticipated.
This article also proposes and compares three tools for dealing
with the problem of spatial opportunism: conservation easements subject
to a form of put option ("terminable conservation easements"), conservation contracts that employ "most-favored-nation" and unanimity
clauses, and contracting with landowner-controlled special districts (in
lieu of individual landowners). The last approach seems by far the most
fruitful. Moreover, special districts have the potential to mute
idiosyncratic landowner preferences and to improve land trust
information about landowners' costs of complying with proposed
conservation investment plans. As such, special district contracting
should also reduce land trust vulnerability to temporal opportunism.
This article unfolds as follows. Part II frames the set of
assumptions on which I rely. These correspond to fairly conventional
views on the spatial element in nature conservation and on the tensions
between country people and environmentalists. They are meant to
capture something of the ecological and social reality in relatively
"natural" rural vicinages where (i) much of the private land is still held
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by long-time residents, many of whom use the land for farming,
ranching, or small-scale timber production, and (ii) there is some secondhome development pressure. Of course, such places are not the exclusive
locus of conservation work, but they attract lots of attention and present
some interesting contracting problems, and, for better or worse, they
represent the universe of the present article. Part III explores the forms of
landowner opportunism to which conservation investments on other
people's land are given and identifies some possible solutions. This part
begins by considering in isolation the negotiations between a single
landowner and a conservation organization and then shows how the
problem changes when the land trust's field of vision expands to include
a landscape of many parcels. Part IV offers a few concluding remarks.
II. AN INFORMAL MODEL OF CONSERVATION CONTRACTING
Actors

7

- Conservation organizations come in two varieties: green and dark green.
Green organizations want to protect and restore natural systems while
maintaining a working landscape where land remains in private
ownership and economic activities continue. Dark green organizations
want to displace the current inhabitants, do away with agriculture, and
let "wilderness" reclaim the land.
* Landowners also come in two basic varieties, call them olive and brown.
Both types try to make money off their land. Olives also want to
maintain something of their land-based heritage and hope for a future in
which open lands, agricultural production, and conservation stewardship coexist. Some browns also have nonpecuniary motivations in their
relation to land. But the browns' nonpecuniary concerns relate to things
like independence and tradition; conservationist ideals leave them cold,
or worse.
Information
- Conservation organizations have poor information about whether any
given landowner is olive or brown. Landowners have poor information
about whether any given conservation organization is green or dark
green. Wolves are feared to dress as sheep.
- Conservation organizations initially have poor information about the
land treatments likely to result in ecological improvements, but, through
7. The assumptions under this heading are distilled from the literature on
environmental attitudes discussed in Elmendorf, supra note 1, at 437-51.
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a site-specific process of "adaptive management" (trial and error), they
can identify and implement ecologically successful restoration
measures. 8 Inevitably, there will be many failures along the way, and
some sites that once looked promising will have to be written off as
unrestorable given technical, financial, and know-how constraints.
Ecology and Economics
* There are increasing returns to scale (contiguous acreage) in
conservation investment. That is, the ecological benefits of a given form
of investment increase more than proportionately with the number of
contiguous acres subject to treatment. 9
* Ecological restoration projects involve large up-front expenditures
with little salvage value. If the project succeeds, it can generate benefits
(with modest upkeep costs) for a long period of time.
* Conservation and agriculture are in general rivalrous land uses,
though some kinds of conservation stewardship are thought to be
compatible with some kinds of agricultural production.
- Conservation investments increase the development value of the
property on which the investment is made and adjoining properties.
Development (conversion to residential use) of the property subject to
the conservation investment, or of adjoining properties, would degrade
the conservation value of the investment. 10
- Protected "open space" increases the development value of adjoining
property.

8. On adaptive management, see generally Simon Levin, Toward a Science of Ecological
Management, 3 CONSERVATION ECOLOGY, Aug. 6, 1999, available at http://www.consecol.org/
vol3/iss2/art6 and at www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol3/iss2/art6; Bradley C. Karkkainen,
Adaptive Ecosystem Management and Regulatory Penalty Defaults: Toward a Bounded
Pragmatism,97 MINN. L. REV. 943 (2003).
9. On the spatial design of ecological reserves, see GRAEME CAUGHLEY & ANNE
GuNN, Reserves in Theory and Practice, in CONSERVATION BIOLOGY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
309 (1996).
10. It may seem contradictory to postulate both that ecological restoration attracts
development and that development wrecks the restored lands- why would the developers
undermine that which creates value for their development? -but there is no paradox if
development benefits from some aspects of restoration (e.g., trout streams) and harms
others (e.g., by spreading exotic plants, displacing native songbirds, etc.). For a review of
the literature on the ecological impacts of dispersed rural housing development, see Jeremy

D. Maestas et al., Biodiversity and Land-Use Change in the American Mountain West, 91
GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 509 (2001).
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III. THE VULNERABILITY OF CONSERVATION INVESTMENTS
The conservation organization that pays a landowner for the
(temporary) right to make ecological investments risks exposure to
multiple forms of landowner opportunism that, unless controlled,
seriously dampen investment incentives ex ante. Ecological and
economic interconnections among nearby parcels of land give rise to
much of this strategic behavior. But for analytical purposes, let us
initially abstract from these complications and consider in isolation the
one-on-one dynamic between the land trust and a single property owner.
Once we have an understanding of that dynamic in place, we can expand
our field of view and explore the challenge of contracting to restore
landscapes composed of many parcels.
A. The Single Parcel Case
1. Two Forms of Temporal Opportunism
Much of the literature on transaction costs and, more recently,
the law and economics of social norms analyzes situations in which an
actor must decide whether to enter a relationship that may expose her to
opportunism." For present purposes, "opportunism" can be defined as
one party (a) seeking to increase his share of the returns (often reducing
total returns in the process) (b) in a manner that was not approved of by
the other parties when the relationship was formed.
Human beings are as inventive in mitigating the risks of
opportunism as they are devious in discovering them. The economics
literature describes a host of solutions. 12 Typically, the literature
conceptualizes a tradeoff between short-term gains from behaving
opportunistically and long-term losses due to foregone transacting
11. Classics include Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration,AppropriableRents, and the
Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & EcoN. 297 (1978); Benjamin Klein & Keith B.
Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring ContractualPerformance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615
(1981); Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73
AM. ECON. REv. 519 (1983). For a theory of social norms traceable to this literature, see
generally ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000).
12. These include (1) government regulation, see, e.g., Victor P. Goldberg, Regulation
and Administered Contracts, 7 BELL J. ECON. 426 (1976); (2) price premiums and brand-name
capital, see, e.g., Klein et al., supra note 11; Klein & Leffler, supra note 11; (3) ex-ante
screening for "good cooperators," see, e.g., POSNER, supra note 11; (4) hostage-giving or,
equivalently, reciprocal specific investment, see, e.g., Williamson, supra note 11; (6) "hybrid"
market/governance relationships crafted by contract, see, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON,
Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives, in THE
MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 93 (1996); (7) governance-by-hierarchy, or vertical
integration, see, e.g., id.; Klein et al., supra note 11.
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opportunities, the opportunities being lost on account of earlier
opportunism.' 3 Under these circumstances, the prospect of future
transactions - at the right price - may be enough to curtail opportunism.
Thus, as Klein and his coauthors have shown, if Buyer B is a repeat
customer of Producer P, B can induce P not to behave opportunistically
(e.g., not to shade on hard-to-monitor attributes of product quality) if B
pays P a premium price for the good in question and credibly threatens
to cease doing business with P in the event that B discovers that he has
goods. 14 The premium price means that P earns a
been sold shoddy
"quasi-rent"' 5 by doing business with B, and, if the present value of that
16
rent exceeds the short-term benefits of opportunism, P won't "cheat."
In Klein & Leffler's model, advertising and other conspicuous
sunk costs communicate that a product's selling price incorporates a
large quasi-rent-for otherwise the firm could not afford the
advertising -and thus let the customer know that the firm is unlikely to
cheat. 17 Eric Posner uses a similar logic to account for the existence of
social norms. 18 On his interpretation, norms are just a way that people
publicly sink costs to attract partners for cooperative ventures. Agent A
complies with an "expensive" norm, the thinking goes, because doing so
signals the value she expects to receive from a prospective cooperative
venture. Assuming that the venture in prospect has the structure of a
repeat-play prisoner's dilemma, then the agents who stand to gain the
most from playing (partaking of the venture) are those with the lowest
discount rates. These agents also make the best cooperative partners, for
they are unlikely to sacrifice future cooperative gains for the one-time
reward of defection. Agents with higher discount rates, who do not
stand to gain as much from the subsequent venture, will not bother to
comply with expensive norms. Costly and conspicuous norm compliance
thus affords a means by which the "good types" - those with low
discount rates -can find each other and pair off for happy cooperative
hereafters.

13. See Klein et al., supra note 11; Klein & Leffler, supra note 11; POSNER, supra note 11.
See also David M. Kreps, CorporateCulture and Economic Theory, in PERSPECrIVES ON POSTIVE
POLMCAL ECONOMY 90 Games E. Alt & Kenneth A. Schepsle eds., 1990).
14. Klein et al., supranote 11, at 304-05.
15. Id. at 298 (defining the "quasi-rent value of an asset" as "the excess of its value over
its salvage value, that is its value in its next best use to another renter").
16. Insofar as P has many customers, who communicate at low cost with one another,
then, ceteris paribus, the price premium necessary to induce cooperation is lower, because
P's cheating of any one customer will cause others to jump ship.
17. Klein & Leffler, supranote 11, at 627-33.
18. POSNER, supra note 11.
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The ecological investment/adaptive management "game"
involves ongoing interactions between the landowner and the
conservation organization, so it is natural to try to extend the Klein and
Posner models to this context. The extension is plausible insofar as (1)
the returns on ecological investments are temporally coextensive with
the duration of the investment contracts, such that (2) landowner
opportunism is limited to intra-contractopportunism (noncompliance with
her duties under the investment agreement), and (3) conservation
organizations face a competitive supply of investment opportunities
(many landowners with relevantly similar properties). In each round of
play, the conservation organization would make an unsalvageable
investment of $X, after which the landowner would choose to
"cooperate" or "defect." If the landowner cooperates, the land trust
would invest in her parcel again in the next round; if she defects, the
land trust would seek greener pastures elsewhere. If $C is the landowner
costs of cooperating in any given round of play (direct costs plus the
forgone benefits from defecting), then the landowner would have an
incentive to defect in any given round unless the land trust pays her at
least $(C + P) for the right to make its investment, where the "premium"
P is equal to rC, and r is the landowner's per-period discount rate. 19
Which is to say, the landowner will cooperate if the present value of the
"premium" (P/r) that she would receive from indefinitely repeated play
is at least as great as the one-time gain from defecting (C).
As a representation of the conservation contracting game, this
model seems inapt in one key respect -specifically, its assumption that
the returns on the ecological investment in any given round of play do
not extend beyond that round. In games of adaptive ecological
management, it is rather likely that the results in round n will change the
payoffs in round (n + 1). What results is a problem of inter-contract
opportunism, that is, opportunism in the negotiation of subsequent
contracts. 20
19. Here the extreme case is characterized where the land trust can do nothing at all to
control intra-contract defection, other than to offer a premium price. In practice, contractual
(legal) controls generally will have some effect, though there are evident limits to trying to
achieve subtle ecological objectives via legally mandated land-use standards. See infra Part
III.A.2.
20. To some extent, the distinction between intra- and inter-contract opportunism is
artificial. A party to a contract may defect not just by cheating on the sly but by announcing
his intention not to comply and demanding renegotiation of contract terms shortly after the
other party makes a large specific investment. This might be classified as an intra-contract
defection, because it occurred during the period of the contract, yet in form it has much in
common with what I describe here as inter-contract opportunism. I am distinguishing
between inter- and intra-contract opportunism only because I think it helps to highlight
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This point is best illustrated by example. Assume that the land
trust's investment takes the form of designing and implementing a
wetlands restoration plan, which entails removing exotic species,
reseeding natives, redirecting watercourses, and changing patterns of
livestock grazing. The land trust and the landowner choose a short-term
contract (say, 5 years), expecting that they will want to modify the
wetlands restoration plan in view of what they learn in the first few
years. Let's say that the wetland in its initial condition produces
"wetland services" that the land trust values at $100/5-years, and that
with probability 0.5 the restoration plan (with full compliance) will
succeed in raising the conservation value to $200/5-years, and with
probability 0.5 (with full compliance) will do no good at all, leaving the
value at $100. Maintaining the plan costs the land trust $20/5-years;
compliance costs the landowner the same amount. If the restoration plan
succeeds, then in period two, the landowner can threaten not to renew
unless the land trust pays her close to $80/5-years (the new expected
"marginal net value" to the land trust),21 and, so long as the landowner
complies with the management plan, she can make this demand for all
subsequent periods. This generally will be much more than the
minimum necessary to induce the landowner's participation and
compliance ex ante, i.e., (C + P) = (1 + r)*$20, where r is the per-period (5year) discount rate.22
A significant implication is that we must qualify the familiar
supposition that players with low discount rates are the "good
cooperators." If, through successive investments and the trials and errors
of adaptive management, a land trust is likely to increase a property's
conservation value over many rounds of play, the most devious and
farsighted of landowners may well cooperate during and between early
rounds of play, inducing further investments by the land trust, and only
why it is that the prospect of future contracts may not do much to control landowner
opportunism.
21. Renewal may not be worth the full $80 to the land trust, insofar as the trust has
other investment opportunities. A rational land trust will evaluate any given opportunity
against the next best (or superior) alternative, not against an absolute standard of whether
conservation benefits exceed the costs to the land trust. Thus, if the organization could
through some other investment earn a 33 percent "conservation return" on its capital over
the relevant time period, it would pay no more than $60 for the opportunity in this
example, i.e., the opportunity to create $80 in conservation value. (For simplicity, this
discussion assumes that the land trust plans ahead only one time period.).
22. Notice that the landowner's ability to appropriate the "ex-post conservation value"
basically obviates the concern about intra-contract opportunism, because the landowner
now captures the social value of her compliance. This should not be considered a
justification for opportunism, however, because the "cooperation premium" solution gets
the job done at lower cost.
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demand rental payments equal to the full, ex-post conservation value of
the property once that value has nearly been maximized. From the land
trust's perspective, the best contracting partner may be the landowner with a
high discount rate who nonetheless does not defect between the early rounds of
play. This landowner's non-defection arguably implies that she has
independent reasons to cooperate -perhaps she takes pleasure in the
conservation value of her property or has other specific investments that
depend on it.
It might seem that inter-contract opportunism is purely a
distributional matter, a question of whether the land trust or the
landowner retains what might be termed the "conservation rent." 23 This
is not so for two reasons. First, if restoring land is a hit-or-miss venture
that entails large, early-round specific investments by the land trust in,
for example, laying transacts and conducting site-specific research,
controlling exotic species, restocking native species, etc., then it may well
be uneconomic for the conservation organization to make these
investments unless it will earn quasi-rents down the road. 24 The returns
on successful restoration projects have a heavy load to carry: they must
justify not only the associated site-specific information gathering and
land treatments, but also the costs of the many failures implied by the
fact of ecological uncertainty and the vicissitudes of adaptive
management. Second, the land trust, as a nonprofit organization in the
public-goods business, does not have access to a private-market supply
of capital commensurate with the value it can produce. Its work
ultimately depends on public subsidies. Raising public moneys is
politically difficult and economically costly (due, for example, to the
"excess burden" associated with the familiar forms of taxation). From a
societal perspective, then, contracting arrangements that keep the
landowner from appropriating the conservation rent are generally
desirable, for they allow more conservation value to be created with a
given public subsidy.25
The next sections consider several means by which inter-contract
opportunism might be controlled: (i) "active management" conservation
easements, (ii) land trust reputation, (iii) open space conservation
easements, (iv) preference signaling through the "bargain sale" of
23. "Conservation rent" can be understood as the value of a conservation investment
less the associated landowner and the land-trust costs.
24. Of course a land trust only "earns" rents metaphorically-the benefit is a public
good that accrues to society, not to the land trust's balance sheet.
25. Cf.Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Takings and
Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REV. 305, 354-67 (1997) (styling the question of whether society
should compensate landowners whose property's market value is diminished by habitat
regulations as a question of optimal tax policy).
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conservation easements or ecological investment opportunities, (v)
"liability rule" conservation easements, and (vi) mortgages.
2. Governance by "Active Management" Conservation Easement

From an ex-ante perspective, the prospect of landowner
opportunism at the inter-contract stage militates in favor of vertical
integration-land trust ownership of the property in question-or very
long-term contracts that set up what Oliver Williamson calls a hybrid
governance structure between the parties. 26 The perpetual conservation
easement represents the limiting case of such governance-by-contract
arrangement. Traditionally, however, conservation easements have not
been used to regulate ecologically ambitious land stewardship and
restoration projects. 27 More typical for conservation easements is the
modest ambition of preserving open space and traditional land uses.28 In
principle, though, a conservation easement could provide for adaptive,
conservationist management of the servient estate for the benefit of
identified species or ecological processes. This I will call an "active
management" conservation easement, to distinguish it from the more
common "open space" easement. In an active management easement, the
land trust acquires rights to manage habitat itself or to control the terms
on which the landowner conducts agricultural, silvicultural, and other
land-stewardship activities. In the customary open space easement, by
contrast, the land trust simply polices a small set of well-defined
proscriptions relating to activities like road building and housing
development.
There are some serious difficulties with the active management
conservation easement. In the dim light of ecological science, it is not at
all clear ex ante what types of investments will bear fruit and how these
will, or will not, entail changes in agricultural practices. It follows that
the costs of specifying the respective rights of the parties in such an
easement would be very high, and the likely result is either
misspecification (relative to the information that comes to light as
26.

WILLIAMSON, supra note 12, at 101-05.

27.

See BRENDA LIND, LAND TRusr ALLIANCE, WORKING RANCHLAND CONSERVATION

EASEMENTS 5 (2002) (stating that "[working ranchland conservation easements].. .are well
suited for limiting irreversible threats, but less suitable for influencing ranch
management."); MARTY ZELLER, THE INNW FUND, STEWARDSHIP OF THE LAND: AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE STATE OF THE ART 7-8 (1999); LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, THE
STANDARDS AND PRACTICES GUIDEBOOK: AN OPERATING MANUAL FOR LAND TRUSTS ch. 14,

at 21 (1997) (regarding the use of baseline documentation to demonstrate easement
violations, a premise of which is that the easement's purpose is to maintain the status quo,
not to improve it).
28. See the sources cited in note 27 supra.
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ecological experimentation gets underway) or vague standards,
described in terms such as "agricultural activities are permitted subject
to an approved management plan, provided that the grantee shall
approve any proposed plan that does not unreasonably interfere with
conservation objectives." 29 The landowner and conservation organization both have good reason to be leery of parceling out the rights of
land ownership with such open-ended standards.
The landowner looks at the easement and says, whoa, I don't
know whether the group that made this offer is "green" or "dark green."
If they are dark green, I had better not give them much power over my
agricultural livelihood.
On the other side of the table, the (green) conservation
organization says to itself, this easement is a recipe for trouble. If,
through the adaptive management process, we learn that conservation
and agriculture or comparably remunerative land uses are compatible
here, our hefty payment for the right to restrict agriculture will have
amounted to a windfall for the landowner. If it turns out that they are
not compatible and severe restrictions are necessary to keep farming or
ranching from "unreasonably interfering with conservation objectives,"
the necessary restrictions may prove impractical to enforce in court.
Whether a court will buy our gloss on ecological reasonableness, or our
science, is a craps shoot. Such determinations press the limits of the
judicial comfort zone. Even if we were to win on the merits, we may
come up short at the remedy stage. Courts are reluctant to issue
injunctions where the required conduct is uncertain under the terms of
the parties' contract and where the costs of judicial supervision are
high.3° Both conditions would apply here. In any event, the fallout in the
landowner community from an effective remedy would be devastating.
"Agriculture under Attack: Litigious Land Trust, Landowner in Ruin" so would read the headlines in the agricultural press. Catastrophe sells,
even if catastrophe is not representative. The land trust's reputation for
being green-not dark green-would be in jeopardy.
It is no surprise, then, that publications from the Land Trust
Alliance, the umbrella organization for land trusts, caution land trusts
against using active management easements where the landowner
29. Land trust practitioners generally believe that "active management" goals, if
written into the easement, should be instituted through a required management plan that is
subject to periodic approval by the land trust. See the Land Trust Alliance publications
cited in supra note 27.
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 362, 366 (1981). Note, however, that the
new RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVrrUDES § 8.5 (2000) encourages courts to be
vigorously protective and creative in enforcing conservation servitudes. How this will play
out remains to be seen.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 44

community tends to be wary of environmentalists 31 and advise land
32
trusts not to predicate their easements on open-ended standards.
I have one additional concern about the active management
conservation easement as a solution to inter-contract opportunism. The
sequential contracting arrangement that creates the problem of intercontract opportunism also eases the problem of intra-contract
opportunism. The landowner who performs well in one period is
rewarded with a high-value contract in the next, whereas the landowner
who shirks fares less well in the next period. Yet it is conventional for the
grantee of a conservation easement to pay "up front" for the landowner's
promise of perpetual conservation performance. 33 No horizon of future
rewards encourages the landowner not to shirk. Perhaps this problem
could be surmounted by making a portion of the compensation for the
easement contingent on periodic performance evaluations by the land
trust.34
3. Land Trust Reputation
One might think, or hope, that the threat of inter-contract
opportunism is academic, that out in the field land trusts' reputations
protect them against scheming landowners. To see how this could work,
let's return to "round two" in the wetland-contracting example
developed above. 35 Assuming that the conservation investment bore
fruit in round one, the renewal of the contract is now worth almost $80 to
the land trust. Suspecting this, the landowner can try to hold up the land
trust and extract the full rent. But whether the landowner succeeds in
this depends on which is more credible: the land trust's threat not to pay
more than (1 + r)*$20, or the landowner's threat not to renew for less
than what she takes to be the land trust's valuation of the contract.
In general, the land trust will have the more credible threat. This
is because the land trust can back its threat with an appeal to reputation.
If the land trust caves to any one landowner's holdup threat, other
landowners will learn of this and start upping their demands.
Capitulating to the holdup might also weaken the land trust's position

31. LIND, supranote 27, at 2, 13.
32. LAND TRUST ALLANCE, supra note 27, at 10-11.
33. The author bases this assertion on the three years he spent working in the land
trust community in the late 1990s.
34. Publications by and for land trust practitioners do not discuss this problem with
conservation easements. I suspect this is so because, to date, conservation easements
mostly have been used for open-space protection and thus do not place hard-to-monitor
(susceptible to shirking) demands on the landowner.
35. See supra Part A.1.
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vis-A-vis its major donors. (When the land trust's donors evaluate the
organization's overall efficacy, projects that failed to justify associated
specific investments will not garner favorable marks.)
The landowner, however, faces no similar penalty for not
holding out. Her reputation for inter-contract bargaining probably
matters little, and it is precisely because of this that she can afford to be
opportunistic. Were her reputation to matter, as it might, for example,
for the landowner who wants to solicit investments by other
conservation groups, she would have a pointed reason not to extract the
rent. 36
The land trust's interest in defending its reputation in the eyes of
landowners and donors surely bolsters its bargaining position at the
inter-contract stage, but the extent of the bolstering is open to doubt.
Landowners may have meager information about the universe of a land
trust's prior actions; 37 donors may find it difficult to assess the land
trust's performance. And whatever the general efficacy of the land trust's
reputation for denying holdups, the land trust remains vulnerable where the
holdup can plausibly claim that the price she demands is her true reservation
price, not mere posturing.38 In this regard, two situations are particularly
problematic.
The first and more obvious is where ecological investment
increases the development value of the landowner's parcel. The second
occurs where the landowner has private information on her idiosyncratic
(often subjective) costs of complying with the land trust's proposed
renewal contract. Contracting in the presence of asymmetric information
is notoriously difficult.39 The next four sections float possible solutions to
these problems.

36. I suspect that the conservation market is simply too thin and landowners too
anonymous for this landowner-reputation effect to become material in the foreseeable
future.
37. There are as yet no independent institutions that specialize in conveying
information to landowners about land trust behavior. Cf. Paul Milgrom et al., The Role of
Institutions in the Revival of Trade, 2 ECON. & POL. 1 (1990) (modeling how merchant courts
might have served to spread information among numerous agents and thus to facilitate
reputational control of opportunism).
38. A "reservation price" is the "true" price below which the owner would refuse to
sell, in the absence of strategic behavior. For an explanation, see the entries under
"reservation price and reservation demand" in volume 4 and "bargaining" in volume 1,
THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF EcONOMICS 158-59, 190-95 respectively (John
Eatwell et al. eds., 1987).
39.

See generally GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS (1989).
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4. Open Space Easements as Hands-Tying Bonds
By granting an open-space easement at the time she agrees to an
ecological investment contract, the landowner can "bond" herself not to
sell her parcel to a developer at the inter-contract stage. 40 The easement
allows the landowner who honestly intends not to sell to a developer to
pledge this credibly ex ante and thus to attract greater ecological
investment. The credibility of this pledge depends, of course, on the land
trust's ability to enforce the open-space easement, but enforcement
should not pose problems. The requirements of an open-space easement
are easy for a court to understand, violations are generally
unambiguous, and the judicial costs of administering specific perfor41
mance are no greater than in an ordinary land-use dispute.
Enforcement would not impinge on agricultural activity or other longstanding land uses, so enforcement seems unlikely to jeopardize the land
trust's reputation as green (not dark green).
5. Signaling IdiosyncraticPreferences with Easements and Ecological
Investment Contracts
Opportunism on account of ostensibly idiosyncratic preferences
or other private information is not so easily handled. The land trust
cannot be sure of the preferences of the landowners with whom it
contracts. In principle, then, this threat is unbounded, whereas the land
trust can always dispute the appraisal figures of the holdup who
threatens to sell to a developer.
While the land trust cannot know the preferences of the
landowners with whom it contracts, it may be able to form reasonable
conjectures about them. Other things equal, the lifelong member of the
Sierra Club who demands a premium price at the renegotiation stage
will be less credible than the landowner who has never given a dime to
the conservation cause. It may also be the case that a landowner's
subjective valuation of any given variety of ecological investment tends
40. Here "bond" is used in the sense of Jensen & Meckling's "bonding costs," which
include costs incurred by the agent to limit her own opportunities for opportunism and
thus to attract the trust, and investment, of the principal. See Michael C. Jensen & William
H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3
J. FiN. ECON. 305,325 (1976).
41. For a thorough review of the case law on conservation easements, see Melissa K.
Thompson & Jessica E. Jay, An Examination of Court Opinions on the Enforcement and Defense
of Conservation Easements and Other Conservation and Preservation Tools: Themes and
Approaches to Date,78 DENy. U. L. REv. 373 (2001). Tellingly, 18 of the 19 cited cases involve
either a dispute over the existence of an easement or a violation of a (fairly clear-cut) rule
against constructing buildings and associated structures or roads.
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to correlate positively with the landowner's valuation of other sorts of
ecological investments. If so, the landowner's willingness to accept less
than her objective costs of compliance as compensation for a given shortterm ecological investment, or her willingness to sell an open-space
easement for considerably less than the value of the foregone
development rights, might usefully signal her cooperativeness (i.e., the
incredibility of her possible holdup demand) at the inter-contract stage.
The reliability of such signals may be doubted, however, because
if the land trust starts to rely on the (putative) signal, then the forwardlooking landowner who thinks she can garner holdup earnings down the
road may offer a "bargain sale" today to induce high-value investment
from the land trust. Thus, "pooling equilibria," in which both
opportunism- and conservation-minded landowners initially agree to
contracts generous to the land trust, may prove common. Ironically, the
separating equilibrium, in which true conservationists ("olives") underbid "brown" opportunists, likely depends on the land trust having an
independently credible means of refusing to pay the idiosyncratic antienvironmentalist's price. A tipping point seems possible, where the
terms of the initial contract only have value as a signal once the land
trust establishes an independently credible means of refusing (later) to
pay up, should the landowner demand a rent-capturing price. Once this
point is reached, a positive feedback loop drives downward the
threshold gap between price and objective cost requisite to signaling
"olive" preferences. The more confidence the land trust has in the quality
of the initial signal, the more insistent it can be in subsequent intercontract negotiations, and this prospect further discourages browns from
posing as olives and thereby further strengthens the signal.
Notice, though, that there are real costs to a rigid land trust
policy of never making financial concessions at the inter-contract stage to
landowners who were initially pegged as conservation-minded. 42 What
the land trust wants the landowner to do is likely to change from round
to round, given the vicissitudes of adaptive management. Sometimes
compliance with the land trust's evolving demands will impose costs on
the landowner in excess of what the land trust believes to be the
"objective" cost. This disparity may reflect the landowner's distaste for
what the land trust wants to do or private information (that for economic

42. By "concession" I mean concession to a putative preference or other privately held
information. Should the landowner show an objective increase in his costs of compliance,
the land trust can accommodate this without jeopardizing its bargaining positionprovided that the land trust's rationale can be clearly articulated and conveyed to other
landowners.
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reasons the landowner wants to keep secret) 43 about the impact of the
land trust's plan on the landowner's other activities.
Thus, an absolutist land-trust policy against making financial
concessions at the inter-contract stage inevitably will result in the land
trust and landowner failing to reach agreement on some contracts that
would have been mutually beneficial, albeit only at a price higher than
what the land trust imputes as the landowner's reservation price. Hence
the land trust's dilemma: to induce the landowner to give an honest
signal of the overall "greenness" of her preferences, the land trust must
commit to a strategy of not accommodating idiosyncratic preferences
that the landowner first asserts at the inter-contract stage-yet this
strategy dooms some inter-contract negotiations where gains from trade
remain.
6. Contractingfor Condemnation
It is customary to think of the conservation easement as a onetime division of property rights between the grantor and the grantee,
with each party's rights subsequently protected by property rules. Yet in
principle one could also use a conservation easement to change the
means by which the parties' rights are protected-to contract for
selective liability rules.44 This offers a glimmer of hope for active
management conservation easements and an answer to the signaling
dilemma.
The uproar in my active management easement hypothetical 45
might have been muted had the conservation easement stated, "the
grantee may reasonably restrict agricultural activities in furtherance of
conservation objectives, provided that the grantee compensates the
landowner for foregone agricultural income." This way, were agriculture
to be curtailed, there would be no landowner in ruins.
Notice also that when the land trust offers to buy a liability-rule
easement, the landowner has very good reason to reveal any
idiosyncratic preferences that might conflict with conservation
stewardship of her land. These favored activities she might negotiate to
protect with property rules or with "premium" compensation rules that
value the special activity at some fractional increment above its market
value. In any event, the favored things are out on the table ex ante, in
43. Cf. Omri Ben-Sharar & Lisa Bernstein, The Secrecy Interest in ContractLaw, 109 YALE
L.J. 1885 (2000).
44. The economic distinction between liability rules and property rules traces to Guido
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, PropertyRules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View
of the Cathedral,85 HARv.L. REv. 1089 (1972).
45. See supraPart III.A.2.
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contrast to the usual sequential contracting scenario where, as we have
seen, the landowner may be tempted to conceal her idiosyncratic
preferences initially in the hopes of extracting rents at the inter-contract
stage.
If, sometime down the road, the landowner discovers new
idiosyncratic dislikes in tension with conservation or the property
changes hands and the new owner objects to some element of the land
trust's stewardship program, no impasse will occur. Either the land trust
will force a contract at a price determined pursuant to the easement or
the landowner will compensate the land trust for a contractual
modification to her liking.46 In this negotiation the landowner acts as
buyer rather than seller and, as such, has no incentive to exaggerate her
actual (dis)valuation of the conservation measure in question.
Landowners on guard against the "dark greens" may be wary of
liability-rule easements that give the land trust sweeping powers to
restrict agriculture, fearing such easements to be cunning ruses to oust
the simple farmer from her land. Such landowners might be mollified,
though, with supracompensatory protections for farming and ranching,
and with arbitration provisions that ensure equal representation of
agricultural interests in determining what the land trust owes to the
landowner.
Given that liability-rule easements seem capable of solving the
holdup problem and inducing landowners to signal their preferences
honestly, it is curious that the concept has yet to appear in the
practitioner or academic literature on conservation easements. 47 Specula48
tions as to why this is so are largely beyond the scope of this article.
46. It may be objected that such "forced" contracts would undercompensate the
landowner and thus deprive her of the premium (P) that encourages intra-contract
cooperation. There is something to this objection, but nothing prevents the land trust from
offering premiums above the liability-rule price to which it is entitled, in an attempt to
discourage intra-contract opportunism. The difficulty for the land trust lies in determining
what premium to offer, given that the landowner's subjective valuation is unobservable.
47. Note that provisions for third-party determination of price are sometimes found in
other long-term commercial contracts. See generally Goldberg, supra note 12, at 436-38.
48. One possibility worth investigating is that the liability rule easement represents
"too big" a first step for the mutually wary landowner and land trust. Common sense and
numerous empirical studies suggest that mistrust is most readily overcome gradually,
starting with cooperative baby steps. See generally JULIA M. WONDOLLECK & STEVEN L.
YAFFEE,

MAKING COLLABORATION

WORK: LESSONS FROM INNOVATION

IN NATURAL

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (2000). A second possibility is that conservation groups may resist
the liability rule easement on expressive grounds, in that the easement's anticipation of
future compensation undermines the idea that the landowner has certain duties to nature
or to the larger human community, the performance of which does not entitle him to
compensation. Relatedly, use of liability rule easements might seem to legitimize
landowner claims to compensation from the government for partial "regulatory takings."
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7. Mortgages
A final possibility, suggested by the economist Myles Watts, is
for the landowner to guarantee the land trust's initial specific investment
by granting the land trust a mortgage equal to the cost of that
investment. 49 The landowner would then pay off the mortgage over a
fairly long interval of time (say, 30 years), during which the land trust
and landowner would govern land management with short-term
ecological stewardship contracts negotiated sequentially.50 If the land
trust's specific investment did not pan out, or if the landowner made
excessive price demands at the inter-contract stage, the land trust could
walk away, knowing that it would recover its initial investment through
the landowner's payments on the mortgage-or, were the landowner not
to pay, through foreclosure. Professor Watts, himself a rancher, suspects
that rural landowners generally would prefer to guarantee land trusts'
specific investments with mortgages, a known and finite liability, rather
than to bind themselves to the uncertainties of a long-term, open-ended
contracting framework (the liability-rule easement) in which third
parties determine price.
Yet there remains a question as to whether "green" conservation organizations could afford the reputational risk (of appearing to be
"dark green") that foreclosing on such mortgages might entail. In the
uncertain world of adaptive management contemplated by this article,
many restoration projects will fail through no fault of the landowner (or
the land trust). If the land trust is to recover the cost of its specific
investments through mortgages, rather than by recouping a
"conservation rent" from the projects that succeed, the burden of
unsuccessful investments will fall to the unlucky landowners on whose
properties the trust's investments fail. Some of these landowners will
find themselves unable to make their mortgage payments to the land
trust, absent the stream of conservation-contract payments on which
they had counted. As in the active management hypothetical, then, the
land trust will face, as a necessary price of its conservation enterprise, the
unhappy prospect of forcing farmers and ranchers out of business.
Thus, while the mortgage solution is at once intriguing and
comfortingly familiar, its domain of application may be limited to
situations where (a) landowners do not doubt the land trust's bona fides

49. Professor Watts made this suggestion to the author during a roundtable discussion
of this article at the PERC 2002 Political Economy Forum in Big Sky, Montana.
50. These short-term contracts would result in payments from the land trust to the
landowner.
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or (b) the ecological payoff from the land trust's specific investment is a
near "sure thing" rather than a highly uncertain gamble. 51
8. Temporal Oppportunism: Conclusions
Organizations that make ecological investments on other
people's land must deal with intra- and inter-contract opportunism.
Would-be intra-contract opportunists may be swayed by the prospect of
punishment or reward in subsequent contracting periods. Inter-contract
opportunism is the more difficult problem and, other things equal,
militates in favor of long-term "governance" relationships between
landowner and land trust, based on very general ecological goals and
standards of conduct. Yet landowner fears of the lurking "dark greens"
press in the opposite direction: toward short-term contracts that spell out
landowner rights with specificity.
Landowner opportunism over the course of a sequence of shortterm ecological investment contracts might be controlled by a
combination of (a) open-space easements negotiated at the time of the
first ecological investment and (b) the land trust's cultivating of a
reputation for never making landowner-favoring concessions at the
inter-contract stage. This would come at a cost, however: some
contracting relationships would collapse, as when the landowner
discovers that her (subjective) cost of compliance is greater than she first
anticipated, and that she prefers no contract at all to recontracting at the
original price. Alternatively, the land trust might purchase liability-rule
conservation easements, which would give the grantee great leeway to
restrict land use upon paying a third-party-determined price. This would
seem to have the advantage over the largely reputation-dependent
alternative of inducing the landowner to reveal her private information
ex ante (in virtue of the land trust's credible threat not to indulge holdups at the inter-contract stage) without sacrificing restoration projects
whenever the landowner's preferences turn out to be "browner" than
initially expected.
Finally, the land trust might try to protect its specific
investments with mortgages. Mortgages could make short-term conser-

51. There is one further consideration that may counsel in favor of liability-rule
easements rather than mortgages: insofar as the land trust has better information than the
landowner, ex ante, on the likely conservation gains from a particular course of investment,
the liability-rule easement can enable the land trust to "lock in" a portion of the
conservation rent. Short-term contracting backed by mortgages would protect the land
trust's site-specific investments but would not keep the landowner from pushing for higher
payments (at the inter-contract stage) if the ecological investment turns out to be a
marvelous success.
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vation contracts viable, but mortgages would also place the land trust
concerned about its "green" reputation in an uncomfortable position
when, because its conservation investments have failed, the land trust
decides not to renew its short-term contract with the landowner. Without
the stream of conservation payments she initially anticipated, the
landowner may be unable to meet her mortgage obligations. The land
trust would have to foreclose, which may feed fears of a "dark green"
land grab.
B. The "Landscape" (Multi-Parcel) Case
1. Spatial Opportunism

The full extent of the land trust's vulnerability to opportunism
does not become apparent until one considers its task in the context of a
many-parcel "landscape" setting. Because the ecological returns on
conservation investments increase more than proportionately with the
number of contiguous acres subject to conservation management, the
land trust's undertaking is, in part, a land assembly project. Like any
other land assembler, the land trust must wrestle with holdouts. The
problem of spatial opportunism is substantially more vexing than the
temporal opportunism of the single-parcel case.5 2 This is so because,
other things equal, the spatial opportunist has incentives to make more
outlandish demands. And this is so because the other things are not
equal: several factors make it more difficult for the land trust to answer
the landowner's demands with a resolute "No."
Let's consider first the magnitude of the opportunist's demands.
In the landscape case, the land trust's decision to abandon a restoration
project on account of holdouts creates a cost -missed contracting
opportunities-borne in common by all landowners in the project area.
In the single parcel case, by contrast, analogous costs of obstinacy are
localized to the hard-bargaining landowner. When a landscape is the
land trust's object, it can be individually rational for landowners to
escalate their demands even to the point of driving the land trust out of
their community. Each landowner thinks, "why should I be the one to
offer price concessions, when my neighbors do not." Perhaps the land
trust could try to save the landowners from their own too-much by
announcing firm offer prices and refusing to budge, much as it might
check inter-contract holdups by committing itself never to make financial

52. Temporal opportunism of course remains a concern in the "landscape case," but I
will leave it in the background for now so that we can focus on the spatial issue.
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concessions based on a landowner's freshly asserted distaste for the
terms proposed in the renewal contract.
Yet in the landscape case, three factors undercut the land trust's
threat to hold fast at prices that approximate the expected cost of the
conservation project to the landowners.
First, there is the problem of the browns. In the single parcel
case, the land trust may endeavor to screen for and then selectively
invest in the lands of sympathetic "olive" landowners, whose later holdup threats, if any, generally would be wanting in credibility.5 3 Where
blocking up contiguous acreage is the land trust's task, however, the
land trust must deal with whatever brown landowners happen to have
holdings in the target area. And the land trust must deal with these
landowners without having knowledge of their true preferences. (For
however stubbornly the land trust may resist revising contract terms, this
cannot get the browns to reveal, before signing the initial contract, how
averse they really are to the conservation plan.) The holdout has private
information and room to maneuver.5 4
A second factor undercutting the credibility of the land trust's
threat not to pay off the holdout is the spatial relationship between
ecological investment and development value. Landowner B can
demand more and back his demand with a threatened sale for
development, insofar as the land trust's ecological investment on
neighboring parcel A bears fruit. Pathologically, an open space easement
on parcel A, which solves the component of the (intra-parcel) temporal
holdup threat that is due to developers' attraction to ecological
restoration sites, now would exacerbate the land trust's vulnerability visA-vis landowner B.
Third, spatial effects of development on ecological value may
weaken the land trust's bargaining position. As the land trust ratchets up
its investment in knitting together and restoring the parcels in a
neighborhood, the prospective ecological spillover costs (from
development of the unprotected parcels) grow commensurately. Quite
simply, the land trust has more to lose. Knowing this, each landowner
will want to be the last to contract, which makes the land assembly
project hard to get started. Farsighted landowners will demand holdout
prices from the get-go - unless the land trust is willing to settle for a
53. We have seen that insofar as the land trust (credibly) projects an uncompromising
stance regarding concessions at the inter-contract stage, the land trust, in striking a bargain,
obtains useful information about the preferences of the landowner. See supraPart III.A.5.
54. Moreover, if the land trust ends up paying higher prices to putative browns than it
does to similarly situated olives, this could sow dissension among the olives. Some olives
might respond by demanding higher prices on the ground of horizontal fairness.
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term-of-years contract, in which case the far-sighted "brown" may pose
as olive, initially, only to make wild inter-contract demands once the
land trust has assembled the other pieces of the landscape.
Familiarity with spatial opportunism, then, may partly explain
the land trusts' obsession with perpetuity. 55 Far better to buy out the
holdouts once and be done with it, the thinking goes, than to face
periodic holdout eruptions as one or another set of conservation
agreements expires. The more interesting implications, though, relate to
the kinds of instruments the law should enable for purposes of
conservation contracting. Two new devices-what I will call the
terminable conservation easement and the special district conservation
contract-would help to mitigate the costs of spatial opportunism.
2. Terminable Conservation Easements
In some sense, all conservation easements are terminable. They
may be modified or eliminated by, inter alia, judicial action when
changed conditions have destroyed their conservation value.5 6 But
selling a conservation easement to a developer- effectively terminating
the easement, in exchange for financial resources that can be invested in
other conservation projects -is not an attractive option for the land trust.
The reasons are several. State and federal law,5 7 the conception of
perpetuity fostered by the land trust community, 58 and the economics of
transaction costs all may be blamed. Here I want to isolate the last issue
and suggest a slightly modified instrument -let's call it the terminable
conservation easement - that would have the conservation easement's
strengths yet be more readily alienable.
Even with neutral laws and open-minded land trusts, the
development rights embodied in a conservation easement would trade at
a discount vis-2i-vis development rights attached to land, because, in
order to make use of the rights ensconced in a conservation easement, a
developer must reunite the easement with the servient estate.
Recombining these two interests in land entails a costly bilateral
monopoly negotiation, quite possibly with a landowner opposed to

55. Regarding land trusts' attitudes toward perpetuity, see Julia D. Mahoney, The
Illusion of Perpetuity and the Preservationof Privately Owned Lands, 44 NAT. RESOuRcES J. 573
(2004).
56.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 7.11.

57. See BRENDA LIND, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT STEWARDSHIP GUIDE 80-81 (1991)
(suggesting a land trust's decision to relax the restrictions in a conservation easement may
expose it to liability under IRS rules or state laws regarding conservation easements,
charitable trusts, nonprofit corporations, and more).
58. See generally Mahoney, supra note 55.
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development. If the owner of the servient estate can signal this
opposition credibly, she may drive all developers from the market for
the severed development rights.
The terminable conservation easement is designed to minimize
these bilateral monopoly costs. Formally, it is identical to the
conventional conservation easement except in two respects: (1) it may be
terminated without penalty by the holder and (2) it is paid for with an
annuity rather than a one-shot cash payment or tax deduction. In effect, a
terminable conservation easement is a conservation easement subject to a
perpetual put option.5 9 At any point the holder can "resell" (terminate)
the easement to the landowner for the nominal price - the annuity - that
was paid for it initially. 6° The holder simply assigns the easement back to
the landowner and quits making the annual payment. Of course, if the
development rights have escalated in value, the holder will probably
find it advantageous to haggle, but the put option will have utility where
the holder decides to alienate the easement not long after acquiring it.
Contracting with terminable conservation easements would
make the land trust somewhat less vulnerable to spatial opportunism. A
terminable easement affords less of an open-space guarantee to
neighboring properties precisely because it can be alienated at low cost.
The neighboring landowner's development-premised holdout threat
becomes commensurately less credible. Furthermore, the low cost of
alienating terminable conservation easements makes it more feasible for
the land trust to pull out of a locale altogether. To see this, imagine that a
land trust has identified a dozen target conservation areas. Long-term
conservation gains in any given area depend on a spatially coordinated
pattern of conservation investment. Using terminable conservation
easements, the land trust could make quick forays into many of these
communities at once, do its best to block up development rights, then
step back, reassess, and promptly abandon ("put") its easements in the
locales where it was least successful. 61 The more credibly the land trust
59. As defined in the context of stock transactions, a put option is an option "under
which [the] buyer.. .may demand payment by the writer [i.e., the seller of the option] of a
fixed price.. .upon delivery by the buyer of a specified number of shares of stock." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1237 (6th ed. 1990).
60. It is trivially true that a given annuity is worth less in present-value terms if it
begins some time in the future rather than today. So, in this sense, the real price that the
land trust receives upon terminating the easement (sometime in the future) is less than the
price paid initially- i.e., accounting for the time-value of money, the land trust does not
recoup the full value of its initial investment. But if the land trust were to terminate the
easement shortly after acquiring it, its loss would not be large.
61. The land trust might use option contracts for ordinary conservation easements to
similar effect, but the option is a less flexible tool because of its time limitation (the

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 44

can threaten to up and leave, the more likely that holdouts demanding a
contract price in excess of their true reservation price will submit.
That is an optimist's story. A skeptic might point out, however,
that insofar as the land trust succeeds in assembling development rights
to most of the properties in a locale or makes large ecological investments, its willingness to abandon the area is open to doubt. Holdouts
will know this and bargain hard. Developers will know this and conspire
with the holdouts. The land trust will remain as uncertain as ever about
the holdouts' idiosyncratic preferences. In short, the terminable easement
could help the land trust to salvage resources it otherwise would have
tied up in unproductive locales, but it probably will not afford large
transaction-cost savings in areas where the land trust has had
considerable early success. The more promising institutional innovation,
we will see next, is conservation contracting through landownercontrolled special districts.
3. Collective Conservation Contracts:A New Role for Special Districts
The costs of spatial opportunism may be mitigated by contracts
that create certain forms of interdependency among the landowners.
This section compares two such devices: the most-favored-nation/all-ornothing contract and supermajoritarian contracting through special
districts. The former is a free-market solution; the latter would require
enabling legislation that delegates to landowners limited powers of
mutual coercion.
Most-favored-nation contracts are sometimes used where
businesses are vulnerable to supplier holdups. 62 A classic example is the
fruit and vegetable processing industry, where the processor suffers
large losses if it does not receive a regular supply of fruit daily during
the harvest season, yet covering transactions are infeasible. 63 The
defining feature of the fruit-supply contract is a price-escalator mostfavored-nation clause, which obligates the processor to pay
(retroactively) to the supplier the highest price that the buyer pays to any
of its suppliers. The contract thus operates as a hands-tying mechanism,

expiration date). Terminable conservation easements make lesser demands on the land
trust's foresight than do options.
62. See Charles R. Knoeber, An Alternative Mechanism to Assure ContractualReliability, 12
J. LEGAL STuD. 333, 337-42 (1983). Knoeber does not use the phrase "most favored nation"
to describe these contracts, but that phrase has become the favored term of art in the lawand-economics literature. See, e.g., Zvika Neeman, The Freedom to Contract and the Free-Rider
Problem, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 685, 687 (1999) (referencing literature on most-favored-nation
clauses).
63. See Knoeber, supra note 62.
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allowing the buyer to credibly commit not to buy off any given holdup
supplier on pain of paying the exorbitant price to everyone. This keeps
opportunistic suppliers from free-riding on suppliers who play fair.
In all-or-nothing contracting, each contract takes effect
conditional on the buyer signing up all of the sellers in an identified
pool. If perceived as credible, all-or-nothing contracting would allow the
land trust to bring parcels under contract gradually, yet without raising
the development value of holdout tracts. This is because the land trust's
rights to make ecological investments on the neighboring parcels would
be contingent on the holdout's capitulation.
In theory, then, combining the all-or-nothing and most-favorednation techniques could allow the land trust to contract with all targeted
property owners in a landscape without (i) compensating landowners
for the development value that the land trust's own investments create
or (ii) paying holdout premiums to get the most recalcitrant landowners
to join the conservation plan. In practice, however, this elegant strategy
may prove less than effective. The all-or-nothing threat, even if written
into the terms of the contracts, sometimes will not be credible. A land
trust that, let us say, signs up 90 percent of the landowners in a target
locale (the last 10 percent refuse to join) often will be tempted to
renegotiate the all-or-nothing contingency and hope for the best with the
final 10 percent, much as the land trust that has early land-assembly
successes with terminable conservation easements will find it hard to
back out later. 64 Partial conservation success on a large scale is far better
than none at all. Knowing this, the holdout will be emboldened, and
many landowners will compete for that position.
Furthermore, the most-favored-nation strategy requires a
standardized way of comparing all of the contracts in the pool, so that a
third-party (the courts) can verify whether a relevantly higher price has
been paid. This is trivial when each supplier supplies widgets or graded
produce. It is more complicated when suppliers supply land
management agreements, and the optimal content of those agreements
rapidly evolves in line with adaptive management learning. I do not
want to make too much of this, however. The contracts themselves could
set forth appraisal procedures, and the "price" for purposes of the
escalator clause might be defined as the ratio of bargained price to
appraised opportunity cost.

64. Each landowner would have an interest in renegotiating this contingency, because
under all-or-nothing contracting the 90 percent of the landowners that initially signed up
would receive no payment unless the final ten percent join in. The landowners that signed
up initially may not, however, be willing to give up the most-favored-nation clause.
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The final problem is more fundamental: under most-favorednation pricing, heterogeneous landowner preferences generally will
cause the price of the conservation investment to exceed its true social
cost. For example, assume there are 20 landowners in the land trust's
target zone. Each owns 1000 acres. Absent market power, olive
landowners would sell an open space easement at any price above
$100/acre, whereas browns would demand $300. The target zone
contains 15 olives and 5 browns. If the land trust employs a mostfavored-nation strategy, each landowner will receive no less than the
brown reservation price, $300/acre. This means that the land trust will
only strike a deal if the expected conservation value of the open space
easements (their direct value plus whatever they enable by way of
ecological investment) exceeds $6,000,000. Yet the aggregate cost of the
easements to the landowners is only $3,000,000. No deal will occur if the
value of the conservation easements lies between $3 million and $6
million, even though the deal would have been Kaldor-Hicks efficient.
Notice that this problem results from the ecological and
economic significance of contiguity and the existence of heterogeneous
landowner preferences for ecological restoration. If contiguity did not
matter and the land trust simply needed to secure 20,000 total acres
(much as efficient operation of a fruit-processing plant requires that the
operator secure a certain amount of fruit per day), the land trust would
have had little reason to sign $300 contracts. Instead, it would have
sought olive suppliers ($100) from a much larger pool of landowners,
and the most-favored-nation price would have equaled the perlandowner cost of supply. Of course, if the distribution of landowner
preferences is such that the land trust faces an upward sloping supply
curve to get 20,000 "anywhere acres," then the most-favored-nation price
would overestimate the marginal cost of supplying a conservation "unit"
(20,000 dispersed acres). Still, the overshot generally would be much less
than if the cost of supply were proxied by the highest cost supplier
within any given 20,000-contiguous-acre locales. This is so because when
space does not matter, sellers can be sorted according to their costs of
supply (yielding a supply curve that gently slopes upward), whereas
when contiguity counts, whoever happens to own land in the target area
is a supplier with whom the buyer must bargain.
Notice further that if it were possible to verify the net cost to the
landowner of supplying the conservation input, the pricing problem
could be solved by writing the escalator clause in terms of the ratio of
price to cost-of-supply. The early $100 supplier would receive, for
example, a $25 bonus if the land trust later negotiated a $125 contract
with a $100 supplier, or a $375 contract with a $300 supplier, but would
receive no bonus if the later contracts were simply $300 contracts with
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$300 suppliers. Asymmetric information is once again the stumbling
block.
There may be some circumstances in which information
asymmetries are minor. Consider, for example, a landscape where most
of the targeted land is held by publicly traded timber companies, and the
proposed contract involves the sale of housing development rights. The
landowners here all have the same objective - maximizing profits - and
none is likely to have private information on the housing-development
value of its tracts. An independent appraiser's judgment of the value of
foregone development rights could reasonably well approximate the
timber company's own assessment. Things get a little more complicated
if the proposed contract impinges on the use of the land for growing
timber. Some timber companies may have specific investments or private
knowledge that makes it unusually cheap or costly for them to comply
with the conservation contract, and this information they may wish to
65
keep secret from their competitors.
I suspect, though, that the private-information problem will be
most intractable where land is held by individuals or family corporations. Here the issue is not just private information on how to turn
dollars off of land but also that the landowners' objectives, and their
expectations about land-trust behavior, are so varied. For olives, the
many conservation investments will have "consumption" value. For
these landowners, the net cost of accommodating the conservation
investment will be smaller, perhaps much smaller, than the objective cost
(the present value of foregone income or the diminution in land value).
For browns, the net cost will exceed the objective cost. This may be so
because the brown landowner takes pleasure in snubbing environmentalists; or, more innocuously, because he attaches positive value to
his independence, his ability to work his land by his own lights; or
because he is particularly afraid that the contract will turn out to be a
surreptitious power play by which the dark greens wrest control of his
land.
A more promising means of corralling spatial opportunism is the
special district. Imagine that a state statute authorizes "special nature
districts" to be formed by a two-thirds vote of the landowners in the
would-be district. The district, in turn, would have authority to compel
its members' participation in district-negotiated conservation contracts.
In a community of 20 landowners, 14 would have to assent in order to
form the district. Continuing the previous example, the 15 olives would
constitute a winning coalition and could sell a collective open space
65.

Cf. Ben-Sharar & Bernstein, supra note 43.
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easement for $100/acre. The resulting price, $2,000,000 for all 20,000
acres, is too low if the goal is to mimic a perfectly lubricated market
exchange. But it is much closer to the "right" price ($3,000,000) than is
the threshold price ($6,000,000) compelled by the most-favored-nation
arrangement. As this example illustrates, though there is no assurance
that the supermajority's price will equal the efficient price (average
reservation price), it is surely a far better proxy than that implicit in the
most-favored-nation method, i.e., the most adverse landowner's price.66
The reader may object that this argument for the superiority of
special district contracting overlooks the efficiency gain from marginal
adjustments to the chosen acreage. On this view, only the most-favorednation approach gives the land trust an incentive to work around the
brown landowner on the edge of the project area who (let us suppose)
strongly disvalues participation and whose land does not add much to
the conservation value of the project. 67 This objection underappreciates
the possibility of bargained-for variances in the aftermath of the
supermajoritarian agreement. If the peripheral brown really values her
independence more than the land trust values her participation, the land
trust may let her buy her way out, in whole or in part, from the collective
contract. 68 In this negotiation, the landowner acts as bidder rather than
holdout and thus has no incentive to exaggerate her aversion to the

conservation plan.69

66. Of course, there is no assurance that the landowners will bid their true reservation
prices. Insofar as there does not exist a competitive supply of ecological investment
opportunities (i.e., insofar as the target landscape is somehow "unique," such that the land
trust's dollars would not reap so large a return, were they invested elsewhere), the
landowners have some bargaining power vis-A-vis the land trust and may appropriate
some of the "conservation rent." Uniqueness may, of course, result from the land trust's
own specific investments, as is suggested by Part III.A of this article.
67. Majoritarian decision rules give short shrift to minority preferences, at least where
there are few issues on the agenda and hence little room for horse trading. See ROBERT D.
COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTrTION 120-24 (2000).
68. At least this is possible in principle. Whether it is possible in fact depends, of
course, on whether it is authorized by the state enabling legislation that structures the
creation of "conservation contracting districts."
69. Another possible objection, raised by Susan French, is that landowners may not be
willing to "give up their ability to negotiate individually." While every dollar-hungry
landowner would like to be a keystone holdout, the land trust can induce landowners to
form special districts by refusing to negotiate otherwise, or by offering higher payments to
landowners who form such districts (enabled by the transaction-cost savings that the land
trust realizes by bargaining with landowner collectivities rather than individual property
holders). Moreover, once a community of landowners appreciates how their individual
self-seeking can lead to collective hardship by driving the land trust out of the community,
see supra Part III.B.1, they will see collective contracting as very much in most landowners'
pecuniary self-interest.
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Some other advantages of conservation contracting via special
districts should be noted. 70 First, the special district's power to coerce
dissenters means that the land trust does not have to worry about
whether it can credibly commit to abide by the all-or-nothing norm.
When special districts are part of the game, it often will be cheaper for
the land trust to gain control over "all" of the relevant resources (by
contracting with the district) than to control "most" of those resources
(by contracting with individual member landowners). Furthermore, the
presence of a special district in community B weakens the position of
holdouts in community A, even if the landowners in A decline to form a
district, for the land trust has no reason to pay off the holdouts in A if it
can realize greater conservation value for its dollar in B.
What remains to be considered is the effect of special district
contracting on temporal opportunism. At first glance, it may appear that
the land trust's exposure to temporal opportunism is essentially the
same, whether the party on the other side of the contract is an individual
landowner or a special district. Yet there is reason to believe that special
district contracting, while conceived initially as a solution for spatial
opportunism, will also prove less vulnerable to inter-contract (temporal)
opportunism. Compared to the individual landowner, the special district
seems not as well equipped to behave strategically on the basis of private
information about allegedly idiosyncratic landowner preferences. Two
factors account for this.
First, where there exists a broad spectrum of landowner
preferences, special districts will tend to mute the most idiosyncratic.
The districts generally will express mid-range preferences, not the
extremes, because only rarely will landowners with outlier preferences
be numerous enough to form a controlling voting block within any given
sample of landowners. This strengthens the land trust's bargaining
position against self-professed "outlier districts," both initially and at the
contract renegotiation stage.
Second, while an individual landowner might pull off a plan of
deception, posing as a friend of conservation (olive) initially and later on
trying to extract rents following large specific investments by the land
trust, this ploy would seem more difficult for a group of landowners.
Hatching a group plan would involve lots of chatter (the strategic brown
70. As this short article is intended only as a theoretical overview of the conservation
contracting problem, I will not delve into the many practical questions related to the design
of enabling legislation for conservation contracting districts. This is a hugely important
inquiry, however, and much may be learned from the experiences of various agricultural
special districts. For more on special districts for habitat conservation and their agricultural
predecessors, see Elmendorf, supra note 1, at 473-90.
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landowner has to explain to her less conniving compatriots that she is
not selling them out), some of which may filter back to the land trust
courtesy of true conservation sympathizers among the landowners.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has in a very rudimentary manner identified the
spatial and temporal vulnerability of a land trust's investments in the
ecological rehabilitation of other people's lands. There is a fundamental
tension where landowners suspect environmentalists of ill motive: the
land trust wants perpetual or long-term contracts in view of temporal
and spatial opportunism, but many landowners seek short-term
commitments so as to limit their exposure to a feared "dark green" landgrab. My analysis suggests that land trusts may defend their investments
against certain forms of temporal opportunism by tying up development
rights with open-space easements before they sink resources into
ecological restoration projects, and, more generally, by investing in their
own reputation as non-conciliatory "inter-contract" bargainers. The
prospect of temporal opportunism also commends the "liability-rule
conservation easement," whereby the land trust contracts for the right to
make ecological investments at a third-party-determined price. The
liability-rule easement is particularly valuable where information
asymmetries make it hard for the land trust to distinguish cases of (intercontract) landowner posturing from cases in which the landowner's
reservation price has actually increased.
Spatial opportunism appears less amenable than temporal
opportunism to solutions that depend on the consent of all, though land
trusts might improve their position vis-A-vis holdouts by blocking up
development rights with "terminable conservation easements" rather
than conventional, harder-to-alienate conservation easements. A more
promising response to spatial opportunism is collective contracting via
landowner-controlled, supermajoritarian special districts. The special
district solution largely reduces the "landscape" contracting problem to
that of a single-parcel case, where temporal opportunism is the only
concern. Less obviously, the choice to contract through special districts
may also reduce the land trust's exposure to temporal opportunism. This
follows because the land trust's vulnerability to temporal opportunism
results, in large measure, from the organization's uncertainty as to the
landowner's true preferences and her costs of abiding by the proposed
conservation contract. Special districts may reduce the information
asymmetry, in part because they "average out" idiosyncratic landowner
preferences, and in part because they require landowners to make
collective choices, and in so doing landowners are likely to chatter about
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strategy and in the process to disclose private information that may filter
back to the land trust.
This article invites several lines of follow-up research. One
inquiry would attempt to refine and perhaps formalize the conservation
contracting game, in the hopes of replacing the rough conjectures
advanced here with more precise insights. A second path would attempt
to verify, rebut, or refine the conjectures by studying the practices of
conservation organizations and government agencies that have begun
contracting with private landowners for ecological services.
Two policy-oriented tacks also seem valuable. One would
consider and critique the current public policy of privileging a single
instrument for conservation contracting (the perpetual conservation
easement), and a peculiar means of financing it (tax incentives). This
article shows that a wide variety of instruments may have distinctive
roles to play in securing, and thus enabling, ecological investments on
other people's land. As such, it may afford some reason to question
public policies that differentially subsidize the permanent conservation
easement. A second policy-oriented project would focus on how best to
design special districts for conservation contracting, and take up the
question of whether and how special district discretion should be limited
by oversight institutions, judicial or otherwise.

